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Abstract 
 
 
As worldwide consumer demand for high-quality products and for information about 
these products increases, labels and geographical indications (GIs) can serve to signal 
quality traits to consumers. However, GI systems among countries are not homogeneous 
and can be used as trade barriers against competition. Philosophical differences between 
the European Union and the United States about how GIs should be registered and 
protected led to the formation of a WTO dispute settlement panel. In this paper we 
discuss the issues behind the dispute, the World Trade Organization (WTO) panel 
decision, and the EU response to the panel decision leading to the new Regulation 
510/2006. Given the potential for GI labels to supply consumer information, context is 
provided for the discussion using recent literature on product labeling. Implications are 
drawn regarding the importance of the panel decision and the EU response relative to GI 
issues yet to be negotiated under the Doha Round. 
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1. Introduction 
Labeling and consumer information policies are often portrayed as preferable alternatives 
to direct government regulations, such as minimum-quality standards or import bans, 
because they involve lower costs for producers, leave consumers free to choose between 
products, and are less likely to constitute explicit trade barriers (see OECD, 1999). 
However, labeling also raises issues of access to domestic markets for foreign producers 
who want to compete in a label niche. Labels may entail trade distortions or impede the 
entry of producers who cannot comply with specific requirements. Product labeling is 
theoretically covered by the 1979 World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), but in practice a number of problems arise at an 
international level with regard to transparency, mutual recognition, and control. These 
problems grow in importance as increasing numbers of countries impose their own 
specifications and labels. Indeed, there are incentives for each country to develop its own 
system of labels. 
This issue of access to a label niche for foreign producers is particularly sensitive 
for geographical indications (GIs). Because of heterogeneity among farmers, retailers, 
and consumers from different countries, GI regulating systems vary among countries. In 
particular, the European Union has a stringent definition of GIs, allowing supply control 
in order to promote rural development and income support for farmers. The US position 
is that its trademark laws, including certification marks, adequately protect GIs and there 
is thus no need for special regulations. 
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Disagreements over the extent to which the European Union could enforce 
property right protections of GIs internationally ultimately led the United States to file a 
complaint with the WTO against the EU regulation in 1999. The main argument was that 
the EU regulation discriminated against non-EU GIs and did not provide sufficient 
protection to pre-existing US trademarks that conflicted with EU-designated GIs. 
In March 2005, the WTO released the panel report regarding the European GI 
system. The panel’s conclusions and recommendations led the European Union to revise 
its rules governing how international GIs are treated. Specifically, European Council 
(EC) Regulation 2081/92 was amended with EC Regulation 510/2006 (EC, 1992; EC, 
2006b; WTO, 2005). The amendment is aimed at complying with the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) of the WTO. 
In particular, the new regulation allows the EU regulatory system to recognize 
and protect foreign GIs and allows foreign producers to apply directly for registration of 
GI products in the European Union. These changes are clear progress in terms of market 
integration but raise a number of issues that we address in this paper. It is difficult to 
assess the ultimate impact of the change in regulation because so much depends on the 
how the EU regulation is implemented. It is possible that the European Union could 
implement the rule in a manner that may still impede foreign producers’ ability to obtain 
EU GI registration. Based on considerations linked to supply control, quality 
enhancement, and rural development, the European Union could favor a very restrictive 
view in registering very few foreign producers. 
This paper differs from recent contributions by Hanrahan (2003), Fink and 
Maskus (2005), and Josling (2005), who focus on the main challenges linked to GIs for 
the (suspended) Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations. But the 2005 WTO panel 
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decision and how the 2006 EU regulation is implemented may matter more to GI trade 
issues than the outcome of a new multilateral round. 
Before detailing how recent WTO and EU decisions may affect the use of GIs and 
international trade, we review some effects of labeling. We then detail the recent 
decisions announced in 2005 and 2006 and discuss whether or not these decisions pave 
the way to greater integration between different systems of GI protection, with specific 
emphasis on differences between the EU GI and US certification mark systems. These 
differences between systems are often overlooked in the literature. 
 
2. GIs around the world 
GIs, labeling, branding, and/or regulation all serve to mitigate potential inefficiencies 
resulting from imperfect information about product characteristics. If consumers are not 
fully informed about product characteristics, they may consume a product with an 
undesired characteristic or pay a price that does not reflect the quality associated with the 
product in question. 
GIs are voluntarily adopted by agricultural producers for whom the state provides 
property rights protection, laws against false descriptions of characteristics, and 
sometimes quality-monitoring assistance. GIs are used as signals to consumers of quality 
and other attributes based on geographic origin of food products. As Hayes et al. (2004 
and 2005) point out, some of these GIs have had a positive impact on producer 
profitability. Mechanisms for controlling supply, such as a prohibition on technologies 
that increase yields, are sometimes used.  
Systems of identifying and protecting product origin vary greatly around the 
world. Although GIs are used for products in several countries, such as Darjeeling tea 
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from India, Colombian coffee, and wine from Valle del Maipo in Chile, we detail in this 
section GI regulations in the United States and European Union, the two major parties 
involved in the WTO dispute. 
The European Union provides specific legislation for the registration, 
certification, and protection of GIs for agricultural products and foodstuffs (EC, 1992). 
GIs are classified as either Protected Designations of Origin (PDOs) or Protected 
Geographical Indications (PGIs) at the European level (EC, 1992).1 PDO designation 
means the products are “produced, processed, and prepared within a given geographical 
area using recognized know-how.” PGI designation means “the geographical link must 
occur in at least one of the stages of production, processing or preparation. Furthermore, 
the product can benefit from a good reputation” (EC, 2006a). GIs cannot be sold or 
delocalized and are accessible to any producer within the specified region of origin, 
although individual companies are allowed to add their own sub-brands. A consortium or 
similar type of organization comprised of producers and processors normally sets 
standards to control product quality and integrity, ensure appropriate use of GI identifiers 
and sub-brands, and promote the GI product (Babcock and Clemens, 2004). The EU 
system regulates GIs separately from its trademark system. Note, however, that producers 
using a GI may also benefit from an individual brand protected by the trademark system. 
This the case with Roquefort cheese, which is protected as a European PDO and which 
also has two private brands that are protected by trademarks in Europe (managed by the 
                                                 
1
 Although this paper discusses only PDOs and PGIs, the European Union protects a third designation 
known as Traditional Specialty Guaranteed (TSG). A TSG “does not refer to the origin of a product but 
instead highlights traditional character, either in the composition or means of production” (EC, 2006a). 
Recognition of the compliance costs of adhering to multiple labeling regulations explains efforts by the 
European Commission to harmonize the labeling system in the European Union. “National laws vary, 
leading to increased costs for producers for packaging and labeling. Streamlining the various laws will 
bring considerable cost savings for the food industry [statement by Günter Verheugen, EU Industry 
Commissioner]” (World Food Law, 2005).  
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Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market [OHIM]), namely, Roquefort Société 
(OHIM Registration No. 001514124) and Chateau Roquefort (USPTO Registration No. 
000854992).2 
 The United States, on the other hand, regulates and protects GIs through its 
existing trademark system. The United States allows the registration and protection of 
GIs as long as existing property rights (i.e., US trademarks held by domestic and foreign 
owners) are respected. Under the US system, “geographical indications serve the same 
functions as trademarks, because like trademarks they are source-identifiers, guarantees 
of quality, and valuable business interests.” In particular, “geographic names or signs—
which otherwise would be considered primarily geographically descriptive and therefore 
unregistrable as trademarks or collective marks without a showing of acquired 
distinctiveness in the United States—can be registered as certification marks.” 
Trademarks and collective marks can also be used to protect GIs under specific 
circumstances. Generally, however, trademark protection limits new entrants to the 
market, whereas a certification mark allows free entry to any producer who fulfills all the 
specifications for certification. Similarly, Australia protects GIs through its existing 
trademark system. 
 Although a US certification mark is not limited to protecting a GI product, it can 
be used as such when the mark is “used or intended for use in commerce with the 
owner’s permission by someone other than its owner, to certify regional or other 
geographic origin, material, mode of manufacture, quality, accuracy, or other 
characteristics of someone’s goods or services” (USPTO, 2006a). Unlike a trademark, a 
                                                 
2 The Roquefort designation also benefits from a US trademark (USPTO Registration No. 0571798, owned 
by the Community of Roquefort, France) and the private company Roquefort Société benefits from a US 
trademark (USPTO Registration No. 79024385). 
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certification mark is not owned by the manufacturer or producer of the product and is not 
transferable. Certification marks are generally owned by government agencies or other 
types of organizations, and any producer who meets the certification criteria must be 
allowed to use the mark. The US system is self-policing, in that “competitors, businesses 
in the geographic area, or mark owners will undoubtedly raise issues of infringement, and 
failure to comply with certification standards, among other things” (USPTO, 2006a). 
Further, governments do not have to commit resources to ensure compliance; owners of 
marks can take action without waiting for government enforcement, and a party who 
believes that a certifier is not following its own standards or is unfairly denying use of a 
mark can file an opposition, a cancellation proceeding, or an action in federal court 
(USPTO, 2006a). 
 This difference in the type of regulatory system chosen to protect GIs reflects a 
basic philosophical difference between the European Union and the United States. 
Whereas the EU system directly links GIs to certification and quality and indirectly to 
rural development and increasing farmer incomes, the United States links GIs to property 
rights. All else being equal, the more “lenient” US approach on GI definition and 
protection through the certification mark is likely to be less contentious than the EU GI 
system. The US system of certification marks and trademarks applies equally to domestic 
and foreign GIs. Conversely, the driving force behind adoption of regulations protecting 
EU GIs is the objective of protecting product quality and traditional products from 
competition from similar products originating outside the region defined by the GI. Thus, 
one interpretation of EU GI regulation No. 2081/92 from 1992 is that it is a form of 
protectionism behind the guise of protecting quality.  
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 However, the European system cannot be strictly interpreted as being entirely 
protectionist. Any domestic or foreign producer can benefit from a collective trademark, 
as is the case for the Parmigiano Reggiano (OHIM Registration No. 001126481). 
However, Parmigiano Reggiano also benefits from a PDO. The OHIM collective 
trademark protects property rights but does not provide the PGI/PDO stamp signaling 
quality, which was inaccessible to foreign producers before 2006. 
 The philosophical and regulatory differences may partially explain the differences 
in the rate of GI adoption by producers in the European Union and the United States. 
Because the link between origin and quality is more blurred under the US regulation, the 
incentive for US farmers to join a GI may be more diluted compared to the incentive for 
EU farmers to do so. Table 1 attempts to account for the number of EU and US 
appellations linked to the origin. 
As shown in Table 1, GIs are widely used in the European Union. As of 
November 30, 2006, the European Union had 711 registered GIs (excluding wines and 
spirits), applications for 46 products, which have been published for opposition,3 and 235 
applications pending, including one from a foreign producer (Columbian coffee) to 
register additional GI products. At this time, no producer outside the European Union 
benefits from a PGO/PDI. In addition, for the wine sector, Peri and Gaeta (1999) count 
more than 400 official appellations in Italy, 450 appellations in France, and 1,397 overall 
in Europe. 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Any objection to an application must be submitted within six months from the date of publication. If no 
admissible objection is received, the name will be registered. 
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Table 1. Registered EU GIs and estimated registered and filed US certification 
marks used as GIs for selected foods and agricultural products. 
  US Certification Mark 
  European Union   with Geographical Linkage  
 Registered  Products of Foreign Origin 
Categorya Geographical Indication Totalb EU Other Countries 
Cheese 156 21 16 1 
Fruit, Vegetables, Cerealsc 148 49 1 12 
Fresh Meat and Offald 101 21 0 4 
Oils and Fats/Olive Oils 94 6 1 4 
Meat-based Productse 76 4 4 0 
Other Drinks 39 4 0 1 
Other Animal Originf 23 10 3 3 
Beer 18 8 3 1 
Bread, Pastry, Cakes, etc.g 17 9 1 4 
Table Olives 16 0 0 0 
Fresh Fish and Otherh 9 16 0 3 
Non-food and Other 9 4 0 3 
Other Products (spices, etc.) 5 5 0 5 
 
 Totals 711 137 25 37 
Sources: USPTO 2006b, EC 2006a. 
aSelected categories from the EU list of registered PDOs/PGIs. 
bRegistered and filed certification marks with a geographical linkage, including marks covering multiple products 
under a single mark and marks covering national origin (e.g., US, Australian, Argentinian origin). Products with 
multiple marks (e.g., Parmigiano-Reggiano cheese) are counted only once.  
cUS total includes coffees and teas because the Colombian coffee application to the European Union has been included 
in this category. 
dUS total includes meat(s), beef, pork, poultry, and offals. 
eUS total includes ham, sausage, bologna, salami, mortadella, chorizo, thuringer, paté, and others. 
fOther products of animal origin (eggs, honey, milk products excluding butter, etc.).  
gBread, pastry, cakes, confectionery, biscuits, and other baker’s wares. 
hFresh fish, mollusks and crustaceans, and products derived therefrom. 
 
 By comparison, GIs are less widely used in the United States, although 
determining the exact number of US certification marks used to protect GIs is difficult for 
several reasons. First, whereas the European Union publishes lists of registered GIs by 
product category and by country of origin (EC, 2006b), no comparable list exists for US 
certification marks used as GIs.4  
                                                 
4 Although certification marks are the most common method of protecting GIs under the US system, 
collective marks and trademarks can also be used under specific circumstances, which makes finding marks 
that protect GIs more difficult. Moreover, many producer groups file for several different marks protecting 
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Second, US and some foreign producers often use a single US certification mark 
to link numerous foods products to a single geographical production area. For example, 
the certification mark Sonoma Grown, “as used by authorized persons, certifies a 
particular regional origin of the goods: that the goods are grown in Sonoma County, 
California,” with the goods for this mark are defined as “meats and processed foods; 
natural agricultural products; and wines and spirits, namely, apertif wines, champagne, 
hard cider, distilled spirits and wine” (USPTO, 2006b).5 The link to geographical areas 
under US certification marks are generally broader than those for EU GIs. The Arizona 
Grown, Florida (for citrus), and Wisconsin Real Cheese labels apply to numerous farmers 
and processors, which makes the link between appellation and high-quality reputation 
relatively weak. Such broad-based geographical linkages operate primarily as a 
marketing device with little signaling role. Arguably, not all the goods covered under 
these marks qualify as a GI under the WTO definition that the products possess a “given 
quality, reputation, or other characteristic of the good [that] is essentially attributable to 
its geographical origin” (WTO, 1994). Idaho Potatoes, with attempts to control both 
varieties and supply (Martin, 2006), and Vidalia Onions, with a very restricted production 
area (Hayes and Lence, 2002), are examples of products with certification marks that 
operate most similarly to EU GIs. 
 Given these limitations to determining the number of US-protected GIs, two 
major conclusions can be drawn from Table 1: fewer US marks are being used to protect 
                                                                                                                                                 
different words and images for use with the same product. As of December 6, 2006, for example, the 
Consorzio Del Formaggio Parmigiano-Reggiano Consortium of Italy had registered or filed 21 US 
certification marks and 3 US trademarks for Parmigiano-Reggiano cheese. Seventeen of these marks were 
filed in August 2006. 
5 Similarly, an application has been filed for a certification mark potentially covering hundreds of 
nonagricultural and agricultural products produced in Australia. 
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GIs for foods and agricultural products than are being used to protect EU GIs; and many 
of the US marks have been registered to protect EU and other foreign products. For 
example, the European Union has 155 registered GIs for cheeses, whereas the United 
States has US certification marks for 21 cheeses linked to geographic origin, of which 16 
are for EU cheeses. As shown, an estimated 157 US certification marks specifically 
mention the products included in the categories identified for EU GIs, and close to half of 
these marks are for foreign products. Clearly, the US system is open to foreign producers. 
 However, the recent attempt by the Ethiopian government to register trademarks 
for the names of Ethiopian-grown coffee indicates that the US trademark system may be 
less lenient than the EU trademark system in defining what constitutes a generic name. In 
2005, the Government of Ethiopia filed applications in more than 30 countries to register 
the names Sidamo, Harar, and Yrigacheffe as trademarks for coffees grown in those 
areas. A trademark would give the Ethiopian government greater control of prices than 
would a certification mark, and the UK charity Oxfam estimates that Ethiopia could earn 
an estimated US$88 million extra per year (BBC News, 2006). As trademarks are 
registered, the Ethiopian Intellectual Property Office would license the use of the coffee 
names to individual coffee companies. The licenses would be issued free of charge 
(EIPO, 2006). 
 In the United States, the National Coffee Association (NCA), a US trade 
association, filed letters of protest for the Sidamo and Harar applications. Yrigacheffe 
was registered as a trademark, but Sidamo and Harar were denied registration on the 
basis that they are generic names. This last decision could make it more difficult for 
Ethiopian growers or the government to use US certification marks in the future to 
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control the quality of Sidamo and Harar coffee. In the European Union, on the other 
hand, all three names were registered in the United Kingdom and as EU Community 
Trademarks without opposition. The Community Trademark protects the marks in all EU 
member countries and extends protection as new members join the union. 
 Starbucks Corporation has been linked to the NCA actions against Ethiopia’s 
trademark applications (BBC News, 2006). In 2004, Starbucks filed a USPTO application 
to register Shirkina Sun-Dried Sidamo for trademark protection but abandoned the 
application following opposition. The link to Starbucks has focused much media attention 
on the case, and the Ethiopian applications exemplify the intellectual property issues 
facing multinational corporations that must operate under different systems in different 
countries. Starbucks will have to observe EU trademark regulations for the three 
Ethiopian coffees if they are sold in Starbucks stores in the United Kingdom and in other 
EU countries under the Community Trademark, as well as in other countries that allow 
registration of one or more of the trademarks. This coffee example is the epitome of the 
philosophical differences over property rights definitions between the European Union 
and the United States. 
We now turn to a brief review of economic mechanisms that will be useful in 
understanding the consequences of the recent WTO and EU decisions. 
 
3. GIs and international trade 
The need for quality signals may be important when consumers cannot be certain of a 
product’s origin, which is the case when agricultural products from a variety of 
processors and countries are sold at the retail level with no brand designation. This lack 
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of information may explain why GIs are increasingly favored by consumers in Europe 
and by a smaller proportion of US consumers. In particular, GIs provide value when they 
protect the common reputation of farmers who strive to improve the quality of their 
products.  
Trade liberalization and the resulting increased international competition lead to 
new competitive environments that modify the incentives for signaling strategies. In 
general, under perfect information and perfect competition, opening a domestic market to 
imports increases domestic welfare. Under imperfect information, opening a market to 
foreign competition increases the incentive for domestic producers to differentiate their 
product by improving quality and by supplying consumers with additional product 
information. Faced with having to choose between a familiar domestic product or a new 
imported product, domestic consumers may want more information about the origin of 
the imported product and how the imported product was produced. These effects may 
lead to the emergence of new brands or labels, leading to potential label proliferation and 
greater use of GIs.  
However, if the fixed cost for informing and improving quality is high, trade 
liberalization may result in concentration of brands and advertising. Shaked and Sutton 
(1987) showed that concentration increases as market size increases (which is the case 
with trade liberalization). If quality and information are produced at a fixed cost, a firm—
by selecting a relatively high level of quality—can potentially drive competitors with 
lower-quality products out of a market. Existing producers may choose not to pass on the 
fixed cost to consumers via prices, thus eliminating potential rivals. As a result, 
concentration at the producer level will increase and product variety could decrease, 
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suggesting that globalization could reduce both the number of producers of a product and 
the number of brands.  
The use of GIs could also be limited by another feature of globalization. As 
international markets for food products increase, the capital and the technology required 
to achieve quality should move around the world and smooth out quality differences 
among countries. As a consequence, the use of GIs could eventually be limited to 
distinguishing idiosyncratic dimensions coming from climate or territory specificity. 
Perhaps the most affected product by international competition is wine, where the 
development of brands and increased winery concentration in Australia and Chile are 
challenging the leadership of the European GI in world markets. The wine sector in the 
European Union is based on the GI for medium- and high-quality wines, in which grape 
production is regulated, with a maximum yield allowed per unit of land.6  
Some European GIs impose numerous restrictions that stifle the search for 
commercial efficiency. The excess of regulation for linking origin and quality seems 
problematic (see Zago and Pick, 2004, and Ribaut, 2005). Conversely, the main features 
of regulations in the United States, Chile, and Australia are the lack of detailed rules, that 
is, the freedom to experiment with new techniques; the production and marketing of 
wines according to single varieties of grapes, sometimes associated with the production 
region; and the very intense use of marketing investments.  
                                                 
6 This yield system, which is often disconnected from market demand, does not impede excess supply in 
some areas, as for the Beaujolais area in France in 2005 (Bombaron, 2005). The maximum yield imposed 
on a GI may impede farmers’ ability to reach the minimum-efficient scale. Benitez et al. (2005) compare 
the cost structure of GI producers with non-GI producers for the production of French Brie cheese. They 
demonstrate that GI producers face a more costly production technology and do not profit from scale 
economies. 
 14
Wine promotion in Australia, Chile, and by large US producers favors brand 
advertising, which facilitates the development of a good reputation and recognition by 
buyers. The brand is clearly the most visible information for Australian wines. This trend 
seems consistent with the theoretical results of Shaked and Sutton (1987), namely, a trend 
toward more concentration of brands in the context of an increase in market size. Smaller 
US wine producers are increasingly relying on appellations to distinguish their wine.  
Unlike the wine industry in Australia or Chile, the industry in Europe is very 
fragmented (Marette and Zago, 2003).7 The large number of GIs assures product diversity 
but certainly increases buyers’ confusion (see Consumer Reports, 1997).8 However, GI 
designation still matters as a way to signal a collective reputation. The Champagne 
appellation is an example in which the combination of famous brands (with large 
vineyard size and enough capital for advertising) and a prestigious GI matters to 
consumers ready to pay a large premium (Combris et al., 2003). An “efficient” 
combination of brands and a GI also characterizes the Napa Valley appellation, which 
generates a price premium compared to an equivalent-quality bottle of wine with a 
different appellation (Bombrun and Sumner, 2003). The GI issue regarding international 
trade is perhaps overstated, as the wine example underscores the fragility of the GI 
system for wine as a result of recent changes in the world wine market. 
                                                 
7 Wineries in Australia are much larger than those in Europe. The average vineyard size in France is less 
than 2 hectares, versus 111 hectares in Australia.  
8 Berthomeau (2002) discusses the difficulty that various French appellations have had in entering new 
export markets because of the absence of any clear specification of the label that distinguishes one 
appellation from another in consumers’ minds. The collective reputation of French wines plummeted 
during the last decade (Conan, 2005; Echikson, 2005; Ribaut, 2005). In response to some of these 
problems, the GI system in Europe is undergoing a process of reform (Giraud-Heraud et al., 2002; Ribaut, 
2005). The inter-professional group of Bordeaux producers (CIVB, Conseil Interprofessionnel des vins de 
Bordeaux), for example, completely revamped its generic advertising campaign for reaching consumers of 
different countries in order to restore its collective reputation (Germain, 2005). 
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Beyond the wine market, empirical evidence supports the notion that some 
consumers are interested in getting more information about the conditions of production 
from different countries and that increased international trade leads to a higher consumer 
sensitivity regarding the origin of products. Loureiro and McCluskey (2000) show that 
inclusion of a label of origin on fresh meat in Spain leads to a price premium for 
medium-quality meat. Scarpa et al. (2005) and Whirthgen (2005) confirm the existence of 
consumer preferences for territorial origin of production certification and regional food. 
Stefani et al. (2005) show that in the case of Italian spelt, a direct impact of origin on 
willingness to pay exists. Roosen et al. (2003) also suggest that consumers place more 
importance on labels of origin as opposed to private brands for beef, although this study 
is applied to European consumers facing bovine spongiform encephalopathy, or “mad 
cow disease,” for whom regional labels take on a highly significant meaning. Bazoche et 
al. (2005) show that origin matters during an experimental process comparing consumers’ 
reactions to French and Californian wines. 
The previously described developments suggest that a significant effect on prices 
or consumers’ willingness to pay exists, even if the price premium may be relatively low. 
As McCluskey and Loureiro (2003, p. 101) mention, “The major generalization we can 
draw from [the] group of empirical studies on consumer response to food labeling is that 
the consumer must perceive high eating quality in order for the food product to command 
a premium. This was particularly important for socially responsible and origin-based 
products.” This finding means that good quality is essential to obtaining a premium with 
a GI. This is a sensitive issue for (1) the plethora of GIs in Europe (namely, 711 
PDOs/PGIs noted in Table 1), creating risks of confusion for consumers by making it 
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difficult to identify high-quality products;9 and (2) US certification marks that are defined 
at state levels and that imply the participation of numerous farmers and processors, which 
makes the link between appellation and high-quality reputation relatively shaky. 
The previous examples suggest that the importance of GIs is sometimes 
overstated when alternative and less regulated methods of brand promotion are possible. 
Producers who cannot enter a protected GI system can always turn to the classical 
trademark system, which protects foreign brands in the European Union, the United 
States, and many other countries. 
Concern over trademark issues is one reason the United States objected so 
strongly to the EU GI regulation. The European Union has consistently viewed GIs as an 
effective method of labeling and protecting quality in agricultural products and has 
enacted policies to support their use. The United States has neither encouraged nor 
discouraged the use of GIs for US products and has incorporated GI protection into its 
existing trademark system. Given these philosophical differences over how GIs should be 
recognized and regulated, the United States (and other countries) perceived the EU 
system as a threat to existing trademarks, many of which would be affected if the 
European Union were to accomplish its goal of gaining exclusive use of selected product 
names considered generic in the United States. The US cheese industry, for example, 
would potentially lose rights to many names that are already trademarked or used 
                                                 
9 Label proliferation is the main flaw in promoting high-quality reputation (Lohr, 1998 and Clemens, 
2005). Indeed, Loisel and Couvreur (2001) show that even in France such signals of quality are not clear to 
many consumers. For example, recognition of quality labels by French consumers is only 43% for Label 
Rouge (a high-quality seal for poultry; see Westgreen, 1999), 18% for l'Agriculture Biologique (organic 
food), and 12% for Appellations d'Origine Contrôlée (the French GI). One major problem is simply the 
legibility and clarity of a label, especially one showing some official seal. Although Label Rouge is a well-
established label, suggesting that reputation matters, the fact that less than half of French consumers 
recognize it is suggestive of the problems inherent in any label. 
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generically. We now turn to a description of the recent WTO decisions and their potential 
to affect agricultural markets and trade. 
 
4. The recent WTO decision and its consequences 
Philosophical and regulatory differences regarding GI protection between the United 
States and the European Union, and the lack of codified or uniformly enforced systems in 
other countries, underpin the debate over how GIs should be protected under the WTO. 
There is an inclination for each country to develop its own system of GI registration and 
protection, which raises the issue of access to the domestic market for foreign producers 
who want to compete against a protected GI in a label niche. In principle, foreign 
producers (with enough capital) could adhere to a voluntary label program and benefit 
from a collective reputation already established by a common label, which should favor 
entry. However, the cost of complying with label requirements may be prohibitive, 
particularly for producers in developing countries. Harmonization of different labeling 
systems is difficult to implement because some countries must make their labeling rules 
more stringent while others must make their rules more lenient.  
In contrast to standardization (or harmonization), mutual recognition is the 
alternative way to combine labeling diversity and trade development among countries. 
However, mutual recognition of labeling is sometimes difficult to achieve because 
countries apply relevant criteria more or less strictly, as in the case of organically farmed 
products. In the debate over GIs, the stumbling block is the relative importance of 
production conditions to consumers with preferences that vary greatly among countries, 
impeding harmonization of recognition and enforcement. Beyond the diversity of GI 
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systems, the crucial point from the WTO perspective is the equal treatment of domestic 
and foreign producers. 
The recent WTO panel decision on GIs addressed disputes over how the 1994 
TRIPS Agreement could be applied (WTO, 2005). GIs signaling a particular quality in 
products from a specific geographical region are addressed under Articles 22 through 24 
of the TRIPS Agreement. Article 22 defines GIs as “indications which identify a good as 
originating in the territory of a Member, or a region or locality in that territory, where a 
given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its 
geographical origin.” Article 22 also protects against the use of misleading information 
that might confuse consumers about a product’s geographical origin or that would create 
unfair competition as a result of such misunderstanding. With regard to trademarks, part 
3 states that “A Member shall, ex officio if its legislation so permits or at the request of an 
interested party, refuse or invalidate the registration of a trademark which contains or 
consists of a geographical indication of such a nature as to mislead the public as to the 
true place of origin” (WTO, 1994). 
 Article 23 provides for an enhanced level of protection for wines and spirits and 
prevents the use of GIs for spirits not originating in the place indicated by the GI, even 
where the true origin of the goods is indicated or the GI is used in translation or 
accompanied by expressions such as “kind,” “type,” “style,” or “imitation.” Article 23 
also addresses homonymous GIs for wines and provides for negotiations to develop a 
multilateral system of notification and registration of GIs for wines (WTO, 1994). 
 Article 24 addresses international negotiations and specifies that an appellation 
deemed as “generic” cannot benefit from an exclusive GI. In particular, if a quality 
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dimension is recognized for a product coming from a single area, no producer external to 
the area is allowed to mimic the indication. However, major controversy arises when 
names that are protected in one region have a common usage in another. For example, the 
term Parmesan is protected in the European Union as Parmigiano Reggiano, a PDO from 
Italy, but is considered a generic name in the United States. Decisions concerning 
“generic” dimensions are decided by national courts, and this explains why the name 
Chablis is considered a generic wine name that every farmer may use in the United States 
but is registered as a GI in the European Union, with production limited to a restricted 
area of Burgundy in France.  
 The disputes over how the TRIPS Agreement should be interpreted and 
implemented are not limited to Articles 22 through 24 but also include Article 2 
(concerning international property conventions), Article 3 (national treatment), Article 41 
(general obligations), and Article 65 (transitional arrangements). Because the TRIPS 
Agreement allows for enhanced protection for wines and spirits, negotiations for these 
products are handled separately from those for other agricultural products and foodstuffs. 
Because the WTO panel addressed in this paper was formed to decide issues regarding 
agricultural products and foodstuffs, the following discussion applies to those items. We 
now turn to the recent WTO panel decision. 
 Controversies between the European Union and the United States over protection 
of GIs led the WTO Dispute Settlement Body to establish a panel to determine whether 
EC Regulation No. 2081/92, the EU law regulating GIs, violated the TRIPS Agreement 
(Babcock and Clemens, 2004; WTO, 2005).10 The US challenge of the EU regulation was 
                                                 
10 Australia filed a separate complaint and received a separate panel decision. Several other countries joined 
both the US and Australian requests for consultations. 
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based on two main points: “discrimination against foreign nationals and foreign products 
with respect to geographical indication protection, and failure to protect foreign 
trademarks,” which violated the WTO principle of national treatment requiring members 
to provide at least equal treatment to domestic and foreign nationals regarding intellectual 
property rights (USPTO, n.d.). 
 In a 1999 request for consultations, the United States contended that Regulation 
2081/92 did not “provide sufficient protection to pre-existing trademarks that are similar 
or identical to a geographical indication” and was inconsistent with the European Union’s 
obligations under the TRIPS Agreement (WTO, 2006). In 2003, the United States filed an 
additional request for consultations concerning the protection of trademarks and GIs for 
agricultural products and foodstuffs, contending that Regulation 2081/92 limited the GIs 
that the European Union would protect and limited access to the GI procedures and 
protections by nationals of other WTO members. The second request, which served as a 
supplement to the original request, claimed inconsistencies with articles of the TRIPS 
Agreement and the 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).11 The US 
position with respect to its domestic market is that its trademark laws (in the form of 
certification marks) adequately protect US and non-US GIs alike, and that there is no 
further need for special property right protection for GIs. A WTO dispute settlement 
panel was formed in October 2003. 
 In April 2005, the WTO panel ruled that the United States had not made a prima 
facie case supporting all the elements of its complaint, but that EC Regulation 2081/92 
                                                 
11 The United States was joined by Argentina, Canada, Chile, Guatemala, New Zealand, Paraguay, and 
Uruguay. The counties in support of the EU position included Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Cuba, the Czech 
Republic, Egypt, Georgia, Hungary, Iceland, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Lichtenstein, 
Mauritius, Moldova, Nigeria, Pakistan, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Turkey, and Venezuela.  
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was inconsistent with the TRIPS Agreement and the 1994 GATT in several respects. 
Regarding claims for which the United States did not establish a prima facie case, the 
WTO panel ruled, for example, that the EC regulation was consistent with the TRIPS 
agreement (Article 3.1) with respect to equivalence and reciprocity conditions applicable 
to objections, standing requirements for objections, prescriptive requirements for 
inspection structures, and labeling (WTO, 2005).  
 However, among other decisions, the panel determined that EU regulations were 
inconsistent “with respect to the equivalence and reciprocity conditions, as applicable to 
the availability of protection for GIs” and that the European Union could not deny GI 
protection to third-country products from countries whose GI protection systems were not 
equivalent to the EU system (WTO, 2005; USTR, 2005). In other words, foreign 
nationals should be guaranteed the same access that EU producers have to the EU system 
for protecting GIs. 
 Guaranteed access is a contentious question because producers from non-EU 
countries with more “lenient” approaches to GI definition and protection wish to register 
GIs under the EU system to receive the benefits of the PDO/PGI seals that are known by 
at least some EU consumers. The EU system will continue to try to protect both quality 
and common reputation against systems that, by comparison, are perceived to be too 
lenient. 
 The panel also determined that the EU regulation failed  to protect pre-existing 
trademarks from confusing uses of GIs and that the European Union could not require 
third-country government participation in the processes of verification and transmission 
of applications, verification and transmission of objections, and inspection structures and 
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declarations (WTO, 2005). Given that these inconsistencies “nullified or impaired 
benefits accruing to the United States,” the panel recommended that Regulation No. 
2081/92 be brought into conformity with the TRIPS Agreement and GATT 1994.  
 
5. The new EU 2006 regulation 
In response to the WTO panel decision, the European Union published Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 510/2006 on March 20, 2006 (EC, 2006b). The new regulation, 
which came into force on March 31, 2006, more clearly defines EU systems for 
recognition and registration of third-country GIs, allows individuals and groups to apply 
for registration of a third-country GI in the European Union without participation of the 
third-country government, and provides greater protection for pre-existing trademarks.  
 Article 2.1 of Regulation 510/2006 requires that the agricultural product or 
foodstuff “possesses a specific quality, reputation, or other characteristics attributable to 
that geographical origin” (EC, 2006b). Some related points of the regulation will be 
deeply scrutinized. Part 2 of Article 11 states that “in respect of geographical indications 
or designations of origin relating to a geographical area in a third country, verification of 
compliance with the specifications, before placing the product on the market, shall be 
ensured by one or more public authorities designated by the third country and/or one or 
more product certification bodies” that “shall comply with, and from 1 May 2010 be 
accredited in accordance with European standard EN 45011 or ISO/IEC Guide 65” (EC, 
2006b). Some third-country applicants (especially in developing countries) may have 
difficulty finding qualified certification bodies to perform this function at reasonable cost 
to producers. 
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While acknowledging that EC Regulation 510/2006 “made certain changes” that 
address stated concerns about encroachments on existing trademarks, the United States 
does not go so far as to accept that the regulation fully complies with the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body’s recommendations and rulings (USTR, 2006). Specifically, the United 
States contends that the new regulation may actually expand exceptions to trademark 
rights by allowing continued trademark rights only for trademarks acquired before 
January 1, 1996, in cases in which trademarks conflict with an application to register a 
new GI in the European Union. Further, countries acceding to the European Union after 
January 1, 1996, would have trademarks with rights acquired before the date of 
application of the TRIPS Agreement in that country, but after January 1, 1996. The 
United States (along with Australia) has asked the European Union to revise the new 
regulation. Despite these remaining differences, the regulation appears to satisfy most US 
concerns about registration of third-country food products and to move the opposing 
sides toward mutual recognition.  
 Our reading of EC Regulation 510/2006 leads us to conclude that a foreign 
producer now has a chance of registering a PDO or PGI in the European Union. 
However, the probability that a third-country GI will be accepted remains difficult to 
assess. It is not clear how many foreign producers or GIs will apply for this regulation, 
and the only attempt to register a third-country GI was submitted to the European 
Commission prior to publication of Regulation No. 510/2006 and has not yet received a 
decision.12 The Commission has up to 12 months to scrutinize each application. If the 
                                                 
12 Application No. 0467 for a PDO for Café de Colombia, dated June 8, 2005, remains on the EU “List of 
applications for registration of PDOs and PGIs under Regulation (EC) No 510/2006, for which no first 
publication has been made” (see http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/foodqual/protec/applications/ 
pdopgi_list110906.pdf). 
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Commission determines that the conditions of the regulation have been met, the 
application is published in the Official Journal of the European Union, and interested 
parties have six months in which to file an objection.  
The key issue at stake is whether or not the European Commission will accept 
more “lenient” GIs from groups of producers applying for PDOs/PGIs. To protect the 
common reputation of the PDO/PGI system (see section 3 for a description of problems 
stemming from common reputation and labels proliferation), the Commission may be 
tempted to reject applications for foreign GIs from groups of producers applying for 
European GIs. On the other hand, the fact that the PDO/PGI system has registered more 
than 700 GIs (excluding wines and spirits) in the European Union suggests that the 
system will be sufficiently lenient in accepting foreign GIs. 
 Given the absence of examples, we need to identify the chances of acceptance and 
the risks of rejection of a third-party GI. First, there are risks associated with the fee 
charge. Regulation 510/2006 states that “member states may charge a fee to cover their 
costs, including those incurred in scrutinizing applications for registration, statements of 
objection, applications for amendments and request for cancellations under this 
Regulation,” (Article 18). However, no fee schedule has been published for third-country 
applications. High fees are a potential hurdle to individuals and small groups of producers 
(particularly from developing countries) wishing to register a PDO/PGI in the European 
Union.  
 Second, organic exports to the European Union may provide insight into the 
chances that third-country products will obtain EU PDO/PGI designation. Article 11 of 
Regulation 2092/91/EEC opens the EU organic food market to products from non-EU 
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countries based on the concept of equivalence and allows foreign producers to stamp 
their products with the EU organic label.13 Organic standards are set at the EU level, but 
implementation and enforcement of the regulation are the responsibility of each member 
state. A few non-EU countries are approved for “third-country equivalency.” However, 
for organic products from other non-EU countries, import authorization is granted on a 
case-by-case basis, and the authorizing bodies in EU member states use different criteria 
for judging compliance with EU organic regulations (USDA, 2006). This system has 
made penetration of the EU organic market difficult and costly for third-country 
producers without equivalency. Despite these obstacles, many products from abroad are 
benefiting from the use of the EU organic stamp. And, unlike the regulation for organic 
products, decisions about GI registration and verification procedures are made by the 
European Commission rather than the member states. This EU-wide system means that 
third-country GIs should not face the same obstacles that have limited access to EU 
markets for imported organic products. 
 Third, the EU-wide system of GI registration means that the process should be 
less open to influence by interest groups who might oppose PDO/PGI designation for 
products that would compete against EU products. Article 7 of EC Regulation 510/2006 
allows any member state, third country, or any natural or legal person having a legitimate 
interest to file an objection to any proposed registration, but the bases for objections are 
limited to those defined by the regulation. 
 Fourth, as noted, verification of compliance with stated GI specifications will 
need to meet European standard EN 45011 or ISO/IEC Guide 65 (the same standards 
                                                 
13 Lohr and Krissoff (2001) show ambiguous effects of these mutual recognition programs in terms of 
domestic and exporters’ welfare for organic products. 
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used for verification of third-country organic systems). Verification must be ensured by 
at least one public authority designated by the third country or by at least one product 
certification body. The important point is that producers from a country without a specific 
GI regulation may benefit from the EU recognition of GIs as soon as a product receives 
certification by a private body. In other words, foreign producers may benefit from this 
established EU system without undertaking major regulatory reforms in their own 
countries, which means that globalization may also occur without harmonization of 
regulation. The costs of meeting these standards may limit the ability of some producer 
groups to register a PDO/PGI in the European Union, especially those from developing 
countries that do not have public authorities or certification bodies qualified to meet EU 
verification standards. 
 Fifth, uncertainty still remains regarding the equal treatment of domestic and 
foreign producers benefiting from the PDO/PGI system. For instance, the European 
Union may jointly finance advertising campaigns for promoting food products (see EC, 
2005). In particular, EC Regulation 2826/2000 on information and promotion actions for 
agricultural products on the internal market allows the European Union to finance 
information campaigns for the EU PDO/PGI system (EC, 2002). As soon as a foreign 
producer obtains EU GI registration, that producer should be eligible to use the EU 
subsidy system for quality promotion. This issue is still not clear because the European 
Union may refuse the promotion subsidies to foreign producers with a European 
PDO/PGI by arguing that European domestic producers do not benefit from promotion 
subsidies abroad. 
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Sixth, even though the United States was the primary complainant for the WTO 
panel report of March 2005, it seems likely that the opportunity to apply for an EU 
PGI/PDO will be used mainly by non-US farmers because the use of US certification 
marks as GIs is less developed in the United States (see Table 1). Compared to US 
producers, farmers from developing countries may be more interested in using PGI/PDO 
to enter the EU high-quality market. One interesting option for farmers in developing 
countries would be to “couple” the PGI/PDO with other labels such as fair trade labels, 
which are supposed to favor decent incomes for “poor” farmers.14 Recently, labels for 
fair trade and fair working conditions in developing countries have gained prominence, 
although these producers’ market share in Western countries is relatively limited 
(between 2% and 4% for different products and locations).  
Note that this last option was not selected by the government of Ethiopia, which 
chose the trademark option for its coffees. The trademarks were accepted in the United 
Kingdom (and by extension in the European Union) in 2006 (see, for example, Harar 
with the OHIM Registration No. 004348777), whereas two of the three were rejected in 
the United States. The choice to register as a trademark gives exclusive right to the owner 
(namely, the Ethiopian government) in Europe, while a PDO/PGI would be more 
producer/market oriented if Ethiopian farmers unions were the owners. The trademark 
system is not harmonized since the United Kingdom and the United States made opposite 
decisions. As we discussed in section 2, this would lead to different royalties paid by 
                                                 
14 The practice of “coupling” PGI/PDO to other labels is frequently used in France, where the Label Rouge 
is mainly given to products with GIs. The Label Rouge (LR) system benefits from a quality reputation 
mainly for poultry. In 2004, the average price for a Label Rouge chicken was € 6.06/kg versus € 2.48/kg for 
the cheapest chicken on the shelf (see http://www.label-rouge.org/, accessed June 2005). LR combines this 
good reputation with a relatively large market share (34% in France) for poultry (Westgren, 1999). In other 
words, LR allows local farmers to develop typical/territorial products with the PGI by benefiting from the 
LR national reputation. 
 28
Starbucks for the Ethiopian coffees in the United Kingdom (with 532 stores) from those 
paid in the United States. 
 Finally, if a third-country application for an EU GI is rejected, the applicant(s) 
can appeal the decision in an EU court. Although the appeal process would take place 
outside the purview of the WTO, the perceived failure on the part of the European Union 
to abide by the spirit of the regulation would likely result in another request for WTO 
dispute resolution. 
 As stated, Regulation 510/2006 appears to conform to the WTO panel decision 
that producers from third countries be allowed to register a PDO/PGI. Regulation by the 
European Commission should allow uniform implementation of the regulation, thereby 
allowing the same protection and potential benefits to third-party PDOs/PGIs as those 
allowed to GI products from member states. However, it also appears that application and 
verification costs may limit access to the EU system for some groups.  
 
6. Conclusion 
Previous studies have demonstrated that labels on goods affected by international trade 
often convey information that affects consumers’ purchasing decisions. In this paper we 
introduce some economic effects of GIs for traded goods. GIs are addressed in the TRIPS 
Agreement of the WTO, but countries have differed in their interpretations of how some 
aspects of the agreement should be implemented with regard to agricultural products. An 
especially contentious issue has been the EU requirement for equivalency to its own 
system of registering and verifying third-country GIs for agricultural products and 
foodstuffs. 
 29
 In 2005, a WTO panel ruled that the EU equivalency requirement did not meet the 
TRIPS Agreement conditions for equivalence and reciprocity in protecting GIs and that 
the European Union could not deny GI protection to third-country products from 
countries whose systems were not equivalent. In 2006, the European Union implemented 
EC Regulation 510/2006. Although the regulation has yet to be tested for a third-country 
GI, the new EU regulation appears to address most of the concerns of third countries 
about the previous EU legislation. 
 The panel decision and new EU regulation denote significant progress in the 
WTO negotiations because they move GI protection toward mutual recognition of GI 
registration systems among countries rather than requiring equivalency. A second 
significant result is that the WTO panel decision demonstrates that the WTO process is 
compatible with EU efforts to differentiate and label quality in agricultural products and 
foodstuffs. 
 Several contentious issues remain on the table within the Doha Round. Although 
bilateral agreements have been reached for treatment of wines and spirits (e.g., between 
the European Union and Australia, and between the European Union and the United 
States), issues regarding the creation of a multilateral register of wines and spirits have 
yet to be resolved. For example, reports from a recent special session of the TRIPS 
Council indicate that opposing sides remain highly polarized on whether protection of 
registered wines and spirits is obligatory or voluntary for WTO members (Agra Europe, 
2006). Work also continues on the highly contentious issue of whether to extend to other 
agricultural products the higher level of protection currently covering wines and spirits. 
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